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The Cellophane Fallacy and the Justice
Department's Guidelines for Horizontal
Mergers
The Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, originally issued in
1982' but subsequently revised slightly and reissued in June, 1984,2 have
been heavily criticized, primarily because of the economic theories upon
which they rely.' Regardless of whether the underlying theories are
sound, however, the Guidelines sometimes contravene their stated policy
of preventing mergers that create, enhance, or facilitate the exercise of
market power.' They do this by discriminating in favor of mergers be-
tween firms already charging monopoly prices.'
This Note explains how the Guidelines discriminate in favor of such
mergers, shows why such discrimination is inappropriate, and suggests a
practical way to eliminate the problem. Part I provides background infor-
mation on the Guidelines. It also explains how, by failing to employ the
competitive price as the baseline for defining the relevant market, the
1. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (1982).
2. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984) [hereinafter cited with-
out cross-reference as 1984 Guidelines].
3. See, e.g., Harris & Jorde, Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines: Implications for Anti-
trust Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 464, 464-69, 476-86 (1983) (criticism of Guidelines' reliance
upon assumptions of neoclassical price theory); Note, An Economic Analysis of the 1982 Justice De-
partment Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers, 67 MINN. L. REv. 749, 774-76 (1983) (criticizing
Guidelines' use of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index on ground that other measures of concentration may
be better predictors of non-competitive performance); id. at 782-86 (criticizing belief implicit in
Guidelines that firms merge primarily as a means of increasing efficiency); see also Antitrust Practi-
tioners React Favorably to New Merger Guidelines, 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No.
1070, at 1315, 1316-17 (June 24, 1982) (statement by Professor F.M. Scherer, former director of the
Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Economics, that he was "just a little bit amused" by choice of
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to measure concentration, a choice he said was "like picking a sharp
scalpel to do surgery on something you don't understand").
4. 1984 Guidelines § 1.
5. There are a number of circumstances in addition to actual monopoly which might permit a
firm to charge monopoly or supra-competitive prices. A group of firms, for example, might engage in
tacit or explicit collusion. Explicit collusion involves some overt agreement to fix prices, limit output,
divide markets, or any combination of these. Tacit collusion involves no such overt agreement, but
may have anti-competitive consequences just as serious as explicit collusion. One example of tacit
collusion is "conscious parallelism," in which each firm in a market with only a few sellers "recog-
nizes that aggressive actions such as price cutting will induce counteractions from rivals which, in the
end, leave all members of the industry worse off." The firms in such a market, acting independently,
may "exercise mutual restraint and prevent prices from falling to the competitive level." F. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 514 (2d ed. 1980). See also Inter-
state Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939) (holding that agreement may be inferred
from consciously parallel action that is interdependent). Another example is "price leadership," in
which firms tacitly agree to follow the lead of one firm, usually a "dominant firm," in setting prices.
See F. SCHERER, supra, at 176-84; see also id. at 184-86 (discussing other examples). The analysis
presented in this Note applies to mergers in any of these types of markets.
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Guidelines sometimes construe the relevant market too broadly and
thereby commit a fallacy similar to that committed in the well-known
Cellophane case.' Part II explains that when the Guidelines are applied
to a merger between firms charging supra-competitive prices, this fallacy
often leads the Justice Department to underestimate the potential anti-
competitive consequences of the merger and thereby reduces the likelihood
that the Department will challenge the merger. The Note uses mathemat-
ical formulas to illustrate the effects of the fallacy on the Guidelines'
quantitative variables and to demonstrate the potential magnitudes of
these effects. Part III explains why the competitive price is the appropri-
ate baseline from which to define the relevant market, notwithstanding
arguments by Richard Posner and William Baxter to the contrary. Part
IV describes how the Justice Department might remedy this defect in the
Guidelines and discusses the costs and benefits of doing so.
I. THE GUIDELINES AND MARKET DEFINITION
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") uses the Guidelines to determine
whether to challenge a merger or acquisition under section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act, which prohibits any merger that "may . . . substantially . . .
lessen competition." '7 The Guidelines, however, are considerably more sig-
nificant than an ordinary statement of enforcement policy. First, the
Guidelines are the only interpretation of section 7 relevant to many merg-
ers, both because private parties usually do not play an important role in
merger enforcement," and because the Guidelines are generally less strin-
6. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (rejecting monopoliza-
tion claims against manufacturer of cellophane).
7. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982)).
8. See Cohen & Sullivan, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the New Antitrust Merger
Guidelines: Concentrating on Concentration, 62 TEx. L. REV. 453, 454 & n.5 (1983); Harris &
Jorde, supra note 3, at 491. The major exception to this generalization is the use of merger law as a
takeover defense. Id.
There are three primary reasons why private parties ordinarily play only a small role in merger
enforcement. First, as Harris and Jorde note, "merger challenges typically are taken before economic
damages occur-before the firm resulting from the merger can exercise the market power allegedly
gained by the merger." Id.
Second, the anti-competitive effects of a merger are often dispersed. As a result, those the merger
harms may not recognize their harm, or may not recognize that the merger has caused it, or may be
prevented by free-rider problems from bringing suit against the firm formed by the merger.
Third, even if DOJ does not challenge the merger immediately, would-be plaintiffs have a strong
incentive to wait until after a DOJ suit is brought before bringing suit themselves since the cost of a
private § 7 suit is considerably less when preceded by a DOJ action. A DOJ enforcement action
reduces the cost of a private suit in at least two ways. First, if the DOJ action is successful, the
doctrine of collateral estoppel may permit the plaintiff to forego proving some elements of its claim.
See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). Second, the record produced by a
prior DOJ action may significantly reduce a plaintiff's costs for discovery of incriminating documents
and other evidence.
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gent than case law.' Thus, if neither DOJ nor a private litigant chal-
lenges a merger, the merger never will be analyzed under section 7 case
law. Second, the Guidelines have considerable impact outside the DOJ
enforcement context. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) uses them in
determining whether to challenge mergers'0 in industries under its juris-
diction,' and courts and litigants probably will use them as secondary
authority in private proceedings.' 2 Some commentators, moreover, have
urged DOJ to use an analysis similar to that employed by the Guidelines
in determining whether to bring other types of antitrust suits, including
actions for price-fixing.'
9. See, e.g., Baker & Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV.
311, 325-26 (1983) (Guidelines less strict than case law because they allow more broadly defined
geographic markets and alter "submarket" analysis); Fox, The New Merger Guidelines-A Blueprint
for Microeconomic Analysis, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 519, 565, 575-91 (1982) (comparing Guidelines
with all Supreme Court cases decided under § 7 of Clayton Act, concluding that in 11 of 20 cases in
which Supreme Court found violation or remanded for fact-finding that might indicate violation, cur-
rent DOJ probably would not have sued); Johnstone & Schaerr, Retooling the Merger Guidelines, 69
A.B.A. J. 584, 587-88 (1983) (Guidelines make no mention of submarket concept and have higher
concentration thresholds than those Supreme Court seems to have used).
10. An FTC statement issued the same day as the 1982 version of the Guidelines said that the
Guidelines "will be given considerable weight by the Commission and its staff in their evaluation of
horizontal mergers and in the development of the Commission's overall approach to horizontal merg-
ers." FTC, Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers § 4, reprinted in 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1069, Special Supp., June 17, 1982, S-15.
11. Formally, the FTC and DOJ both have jurisdiction to enforce sections 2, 3, 7, and 8 of the
Clayton Act. In practice, however, jurisdiction is divided along industry lines. Procedures for coordi-
nation of FTC and DOJ enforcement activities are set out in a 1948 memorandum, signed by repre-
sentatives of both agencies and supplemented by subsequent exchanges of letters. These procedures
are designed to avoid duplication of investigation activity. In any given case, the primary criterion for
determining the allocation of responsibility between the agencies is the experience of each with the
company or industry being investigated. A.B.A., REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 64-66 (1969). See also Panel Discussion: The New Merger Guide-
lines, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 317, 320-21 (1982) (discussing liaison agreement between DOJ and the
FTC).
12. Judicial opinions in merger cases have often cited the first DOJ Guidelines, which were is-
sued in 1968. This is particularly true of opinions written within a relatively short time after DOJ
issued those Guidelines. See A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST LAWS, MONOGRAPH No. 7, MERGER STAN-
DARDS UNDER U.S. ANTITRUST LAW 69-79 (1981), and cases cited therein. One reason for judicial
deference to the 1968 Guidelines, however, is that they were regarded as consistent with then-existing
judicial precedents. See id. at 69. The present Guidelines, by contrast, deviate from present case law
in several respects. See supra note 9. For a discussion of cases in which courts and the FTC have cited
and used the present Guidelines' methodology, see Cohen & Sullivan, supra note 8, at 502-04.
13. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 55-56 (1976). Posner
advocates a two-stage approach to implementing the prohibition against collusive price-fixing con-
tained in § 1 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1982)). The first stage is the identification of "markets in which conditions are propitious for the
emergence of collusion," which includes measuring concentration, preferably by means of the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index employed in the present Guidelines. R. POSNER, supra, at 55. See infra
pp. 673-74.
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A. Market Share and Concentration Thresholds
The Guidelines provide a framework by which DOJ determines
whether a merger will significantly increase the "market power" of the
merging firms and thereby lessen competition.1 4 Market power, rigorously
defined, is the ability to raise, and profitably sustain, the price of a good
above the "competitive price."1" The competitive price is the price that
would prevail in a competitive market, a market in which there is no
collusion and in which no single buyer or seller can affect the price. 6
Since one cannot measure directly the post-merger market power of a
firm about to be formed by a merger, 17 the Guidelines use "concentra-
tion" as a proxy for market power."8 Concentration is simply some mea-
sure of the distribution of market shares in the industry, 9 with market
shares usually defined in terms of dollar sales or capacity.20 The Guide-
lines measure concentration by means of the Herfindahl-Hirschman In-
dex21 ("HHI"), defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of
14. See 1984 Guidelines § 1.
15. See id.; Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REV. 937, 937
(1981).
16. See R. POSNER & F. EASTEEBROOK, ANTrTRUST 1060-62 (2d ed. 1981).
17. This fact precludes using the Lerner Index as a measure of market power in merger cases, as
suggested by Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 972-76. The Lerner Index presupposes the exis-
tence of information about either prices or elasticities. But elasticities are functions of the prices at
which they are measured. See, e.g., H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIc ANALYSIS 53, 54 (1978) (showing
elasticity as function of quantity demanded, which in turn is function of price). And post-merger
prices cannot be measured until after the merger takes place-by which time it usually is too late, as a
practical matter, for DOJ to challenge the merger.
18. 1984 Guidelines §§ 3.0-3.1 ("Other things being equal, concentration affects the likelihood
that one firm, or a small group of firms, could successfully exercise market power."). Concentration is
a reasonable proxy for market power because, as Scherer notes, "economic theory suggests that the
vigor of competition is related positively to the number of firms in the industry, other things being
equal," and that "the degree of inequality can also matter." F. SCHERER, supra note 5, at 56 (empha-
sis in original). Measures of concentration, including the HHI used in the Guidelines, take both of
these factors into account. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. Recent theoretical work,
moreover, has shown that, under certain assumptions, the HHI is directly related to more direct
measures of market power such as the Lerner Index. See, e.g., Dansby & Willig, Industry Perform-
ance Gradient Indexes, 69 AMER. ECON. REV. 249, 255 (1979); Ordover, Sykes & Willig, Herfindahl
Concentration, Rivalry, and Mergers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1857, 1863-65 (1982). But see Cohen &
Sullivan, supra note 8, at 486-87 (questioning grounds for mathematical relationship between Lerner
Index and HHI).
19. See 1984 Guidelines § 3.1; F. SCHERER, supra note 5, at 56-59; Baxter, Responding to the
Reaction: The Draftsman's View, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 618, 625 (1983). A traditional measure of con-
centration, for example, is the "four-firm concentration ration" or "CR4," which is just the sum of
the market shares of the four largest firms.
20. The Guidelines, for example, provide that DOJ "normally will include in the market the total
sales or capacity of all domestic firms (or plants) that are identified as being in the market . . ." and
will choose between sales and capacity depending on the availability of data and on which of these
measures appears to be the best indicator of the effect of the merger on market power. 1984 Guide-
lines § 2.4. The Guidelines also note two exceptions to this general rule: when total sales or capacity
appears to overstate the competitive significance of the firm, and when data on total sales or capacity
are unavailable. Id.
21. ILd. § 3.1. For a history of HHI, see Calkins, The New Merger Guidelines and the
Herfindahl Index, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 402, 408-15 (1983); Hirschman, The Paternity of an Index, 54
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all firms in the industry. An industry of five firms of equal size, for exam-
ple, has an HHI of 2000.22 The HHI ranges in value from 0 to 10,000.23
Under the Guidelines, DOJ's decision whether to challenge a horizon-
tal merger depends on three variables: post-merger concentration as mea-
sured by the HHI, the change in concentration brought about by the
merger (post-merger HHI less pre-merger HHI, or "AHHI"), and the
market share of the larger of the merging firms.24
The Guidelines create a "safe harbor" for horizontal mergers in indus-
tries with post-merger HHI's below 1000; DOJ will challenge such
mergers only in "extraordinary circumstances ' 2 5 no matter what the value
of AHHI. In addition, DOJ is "unlikely" to challenge any merger pro-
ducing a AHHI less than 5026 no matter what the value of HHI, and is
also unlikely to challenge any merger producing a AHHI less than 100 in
an industry with an HHI between 1000 and 1800.27 On the other hand,
DOJ will challenge any merger producing a AHHI greater than 100 in
an industry with an HHI above 1800, except in "extraordinary cases." '28
Mergers that do not fall in one of the above categories make up an "inter-
mediate" group and are judged by a host of other factors in addition to
HHI and AHHI.29 These include ease of entry into the industry, homo-
geneity of the industry's products, and evidence of past collusion.30 Re-
gardless of the values of HHI and AHHI, DOJ (under the "leading firm
proviso") also will challenge any merger if one of the merging firms is the
largest in the market and has a market share of 35% or more.31
B. Market Definition and the Baseline Price
In any particular industry, the values of these three variables-HHI,
AHHI, and the market share of the larger of the merging firms-depend
critically upon the size of the relevant market defined by DOJ. 2 Indeed,
AM. ECON. REV. 761 (1964).
22. If there are five firms of equal size, then each firm has a market share of 20%. Five times 20-
squared is 2000.
23. If there is only a single firm in the market, its market share, of course, is 100%. 100-squared
is 10,000. At the other extreme, if the number of firms in the market approaches infinity, and the
firms are of relatively equal size, their market shares approach zero, and HHI approaches zero.
24. DOJ also employs the HHI and, to some extent, the market shares of the merging firms in
evaluating non-horizontal mergers. See 1984 Guidelines §§ 4.131, 4.134, 4.213, 4.221, 4.222. The
analysis contained in this Note also applies to these uses of HHI and market shares by DOJ.





30. Id. §§ 3.2-3.4. Note that DOJ attempts to determine whether the market is functioning com-
petitively only if the merger falls in this intermediate range. See infra note 92.
31. 1984 Guidelines § 3.12.
32. See infra pp. 678-83.
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market definition often is the most important step in merger analysis. 3
The size of the market depends, in turn, on the price used as a baseline
for applying the market definition procedures.
The Guidelines define the market in terms of the substitutability or
interchangeability of the products of other firms for the product produced
by the merging firms.3 4 The Guidelines measure substitutability by means
of a "five-percent test," which operates as follows: Assume that the merg-
ing firms raised the price of their product by five percent (or some other
"small but significant" amount 5) and sustained that increase for one year.
Then ask, "What is the smallest group of producers, in adjacent geo-
graphic areas and producing the merging firms' product or its close substi-
tutes, that would have to act in concert with the merging firms 6 in order
to make the five-percent price increase profitable for all?"37 That is, what
other firms also would have to raise prices by five percent for consumers
located near the merging firms to pay the merging firms' increased price
rather than buy substitutes?
The sales or total capacity of these firms and the merging firms consti-
tutes the relevant market."' If the merging firms would not need the coop-
eration of any other firms to sustain the five-percent price increase profit-
ably, the merging firms alone constitute the relevant market. The larger
the group that would have to collude to make the price increase profitable,
the larger the market is. The various products sold by this group consti-
tute the "product dimension" of the market or the "product market."3
Similarly, the geographic area in which the firms sell these products is the
"geographic dimension" of the market or the "geographic market. ' 40
The size of the market is highly sensitive to the price (of the merging
firms' product) used as the baseline for application of the five-percent test;
33. See Baker & Blumenthal, supra note 9, at 322 ("Under. . . traditional merger jurisprudence
market definition has been the crucial issue in the bulk of horizontal merger cases."); Werden,
Market Delineation and the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, 1983 DUKE L.J. 514, 514
("market delineation is the most important step in merger analysis"); see also F. SCHERER, supra note
5, at 59 (danger with any market structure index is that, because of faulty market definition, the
index will convey "a false impression about the actual degree of structural monopoly").
34. See, e.g., Baker & Blumenthal, supra note 9, at 324-25. Baker and Blumenthal view the
Guidelines' discussion of market definition as their "most important contribution to future merger
enforcement." Id. at 322.
35. The DOJ statement accompanying the 1984 version of the Guidelines emphasizes that, ".
the 'five-percent test' is not an inflexible standard that will be used regardless of the circumstances of
a particular case. . . . [T]he Department may at times postulate a price increase that is much larger
or smaller than five percent, depending on the nature of the industry involved." 49 Fed. Reg., supra
note 2, at 26,824. The exact price increase postulated by the Justice Department, however, does not
affect the analysis presented in this Note.
36. Such concerted action could include explicit or tacit collusion, or even common ownership.
37. See 1984 Guidelines §§ 2.11, 2.31.
38. Id.
39. Id. § 2.1.
40. Id. § 2.3.
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for any industry, a higher baseline price usually leads to both a 'larger
product market and a larger geographic market. A higher baseline price
enlarges the product market because a product usually acquires more close
substitutes as its price rises.41 For example, consumers may not consider
pink grapefruit a good substitute for white grapefruit if pink grapefruit
cost $1/lb. and white grapefruit cost $.10/lb; consumers may consider
them close substitutes, however, if white grapefruit cost $.90/lb. Increas-
ing the number of substitutes increases the number of different products
whose sellers would have to collude in order to make a five-percent price
increase profitable, which in turn enlarges the product market.
Similarly, a higher baseline price enlarges the geographic market be-
cause it enlarges the geographic area from which other sellers of the prod-
uct and its substitutes could profitably transport their goods to customers
of the merging firms. That is, a higher baseline price enlarges the geo-
graphic area in which sellers would have to collude in order to make a
five-percent price increase profitable.42
C. The Cellophane Fallacy in the Guidelines
The previous discussion raises a fundamental criticism of the Guide-
lines' methodology: In industries characterized by market power (e.g., be-
cause of collusion or monopoly) the prevailing price is usually higher than
the competitive price."3 When applying the Guidelines to mergers in such
industries, however, DOJ applies the five-percent test to the prevailing
price rather than to the competitive price.4 As the previous discussion
41. Another way of saying this is that cross-elasticity of demand increases with price. See, e.g.,
Harris & Jorde, supra note 3, at 484. Cross-elasticity is a measure of the interchangeability of the
product in question for other products. Formally, the cross-elasticity of demand for product x with
respect to product y is the proportionate effect of a one percent change in the price of y on the quantity
of x demanded. E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS 119-21 (4th ed. 1982).
42. Suppose, for example, that widgets are produced in cities A, B, and C, and are sold for $1 in
all three cities. Suppose also that it costs $1 to transport one widget from any city to any other, and
that at prevailing prices it is not profitable for any producer to sell outside the city in which its widget
plant is located. In this situation, each city is a separate geographic market.
Now suppose that producers in city B form a cartel and in so doing raise the price of widgets to
S2.01. This makes it profitable for producers in cities A and C to transport widgets to city B, so that
any market including producers in city B also includes producers in cities A and C. If producers in
city B now merge, the relevant market will include cities A and C as well as city B.
43. Absent unusual strategic considerations, it would be irrational for colluding firms to agree on
a price below the competitive price, which is the price they would get if there were no collusion.
44. The Guidelines state that "the Department will use prevailing prices." 1984 Guidelines §
2.11. The Guidelines also state, however, that DOJ "may use likely future prices when changes in
the prevailing prices can be predicted with reasonable certainty." Id. § 2.11. Since cartels are inher-
ently unstable, see infra text accompanying notes 73-79, prices in cartelized industries are likely to
return to competitive levels. This would argue for using the competitive baseline price when analyzing
a merger between colluding firms. DOJ, however, does not accept this interpretation of "likely fu-
ture" price. Former Assistant Attorney General William Baxter has indicated that whenever DOJ
faces a choice between a supra-competitive prevailing price and the competitive price, DOJ will
choose the former. Baxter, supra note 19, at 623-24 n.35 ("The [Antitrust] Division was aware of
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shows, both the product and geographic markets may be larger than if the
competitive price were used;45 the overall market, therefore, may be sub-
stantially larger. Such overstatement of the size of the market leads to
understatement of the market power of the merging firms, and therefore
to understatement of the anti-competitive consequences of the merger. 6
This feature of the Guidelines is similar to the analysis of market
power in the Cellophane case,47 an analysis many commentators regard as
erroneous. 48 In that case, the United States Supreme Court apparently
determined the size of the relevant market, as defined by the number and
availability of substitutes, with reference to a supra-competitive (monop-
oly) price rather than the lower competitive price.49 As a result, the Court
held that the defendant had no market power50 when in fact it had sub-
stantial market power.51 The analytic error that produces this fallacy is a
failure to count the market power a firm has already exercised (in raising
its price above the competitive level), and instead counting only the mar-
ket power the firm has not yet used.52
this problem [the possibility that the 5% test might be applied to a supra-competitive rather than
competitive price] in drafting the Guidelines; however, it was not clear that anything needed to be
done about it."); see also id. at 624 n.35 (Baxter's argument that appropriate baseline in case of
merger between colluding firms is prevailing, supra-competitive price).
45. See supra p. 676.
46. The relationship between the size of the market and DOJ's analysis of a merger's anti-
competitive effects is set out precisely and in detail infra pp. 678-83.
47. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
48. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 127-29; Baker & Blumenthal, supra note 9, at 322
n.54; Harris & Jorde, supra note 3, at 484. See generally Kaplow, The Accuracy of Traditional
Market Power Analysis and a Direct Adjustment Alternative, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1817, 1832-35
(1982) (analysis of substitution possibilities with reference to prevailing market conditions "presents a
subtle, but most important, analytic trap").
49. The Cellophane opinion, in upholding the trial court's determination that the relevant market
consisted of all "flexible wrapping material," contained the following analysis of interchangeability
(cross-elasticity of demand):
An element for consideration [in defining the relevant market] is the responsiveness of the sales
of one product to price changes of the other. If a slight decrease in the price of cellophane
causes a considerable number of consumers of other flexible wrappings to switch to cellophane,
it would be an indication that a high cross-elasticity of demand exists between them; that the
products compete in the same market.
351 U.S. at 400 (footnote omitted). The Court, however, failed to recognize that cross-elasticity of
demand is in part a function of the price at which it is measured. See supra note 17. The Court
assumed that the current price was the appropriate baseline from which to analyze cross-elasticity,
without asking whether that price was competitive.
50. 351 U.S. at 404.
51. There was evidence that du Pont had an average return of 31% before taxes on its cellophane
investment during the relevant period. See 351 U.S. at 421 & n.15 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). See
also supra note 48 (citing other discussions of this error).
52. The Cellophane case itself illustrates this assertion. Recall that the prevailing price for cello-
phane was arguably supra-competitive, and that at that price consumers regarded a number of other
flexible wrapping materials as good substitutes for cellophane. See supra notes 49 & 51. If consumers
regarded these other products as good substitutes for cellophane at the prevailing, supra-competitive
price, then they probably would not have regarded them as good substitutes if cellophane were priced
competitively. By charging a supra-competitive price, then, du Pont (the producer of cellophane) had
already exercised most or all of its market power, i.e., it had raised the price of cellophane until other
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II. EFFECTS OF THE FALLACY
As already discussed, DOJ's decision whether to challenge a merger
depends on three quantities: the market share of the larger firm, post-
merger HHI, and AHHI. 5 An overly large market5 4 affects each of these
quantities, usually in a way that decreases the likelihood of a DOJ
challenge.
A. Market Share of Larger Firm
First, an overly large market produces market shares that are artifi-
cially small, thus decreasing the likelihood that the larger of the merging
firms will have a market share sufficient to be challenged under the
Guidelines' "leading firm proviso."55 More precisely, if the market is m
times too large, the market shares of the merging firms will be m times
too small.56 For example, if the market defined by DOJ is twice as large
as it ought to be (i.e., m = 2), then the market shares of the merging
firms will be two times too small, or half what they would be if DOJ
defined the market properly.
B. HHI
The second effect of an overly large market is that it may decrease
HHI, thus reducing the likelihood that DOJ will challenge the merger.
To see this, consider the following equation, which shows the effect on
HHI of adding a new group of firms to an existing market:




flexible wrapping materials were regarded as good substitutes. It could not, therefore, raise its price
any higher and continue to increase its profits. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 16, at
360-62; Kaplow, supra note 48, at 1833-34; Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 961. The Court,
then, mistakenly interpreted du Pont's inability to raise its prices further as an indication that du Pont
had no market power at all, rather than as an indication that du Pont had already exhausted its
market power.
53. See supra p. 674.
54. A market, of course, might be overly large not only because of a supra-competitive baseline
price, but also because of inaccuracies in estimation. For example, DOJ might over- or under-
estimate the responsiveness of consumers or of other firms to a 5% increase in the price of the merging
firms' product. Similarly, it might fail accurately to measure the quantity of the product a producer
consumes internally. See 1984 Guidelines §§ 2.12, 2.21, 2.23.
55. See supra p. 674.
56. Proof- Let X be the size of the "original" or "proper" market (measured in sales, capacity,
etc.), and let qi be the production of the i-th firm (measured as the size of the market is measured).
The market share of the i-th firm is therefore qi/X o . Now suppose that by adding more firms the
market becomes m times larger than X0 , that is, the size of the new market is mX o . In this market,
the market share of the i-th firm is now qi/mXo, which is m times smaller than when the market was
defined to be of size X0.
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where:
HHI0 -HHI computed before the addition of the new group of
firms,
HHI* HHI computed after the addition of the new group,
HHIa = HHI computed only for the new group (as if the new
group were a separate market), and
c = ratio of the sales or production of the new group of firms (the
size of the added "market") to the size of the market before the
addition of the new group.
57. Proof. Assume there are n firms in the properly defined market, producing a total of X0 units,
and that there are k firms in the group improperly added to the market, producing a total of Xa units.
The market which results from the addition therefore contains n + k firms and is of size X. + Xa -
Then if qi is the production of the i-th firm, the i-th firm's share of this new, composite market is
qi/(X o + Xa). Hence HHI*, the HHI computed for the entire market is as follows:
HIl* n+k 
q,HHI* =
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As equation (1) shows, the effect on HHI depends upon both the magni-
tude of the increase in the size of the market (c) and the level of concen-
tration among the added firms (as measured by HHIa).
The following example illustrates the interpretation of equation (1).
Suppose that a market initially is defined to include producers of broccoli
in Georgia and that the HHI in this market (HHIo) is 2400. Now sup-
pose that, because producers in Georgia are charging a collusive, supra-
competitive price, the market is expanded to include broccoli producers in
Alabama.5" Assume also that the HHI computed only for Alabama broc-
coli producers (HHIa) is 1200 and that Alabama produces the same
amount of broccoli as Georgia (so that c = 1). The market thus defined
is twice as large as it ought to be. According to equation (1), the new
HHI which results from the addition of Alabama producers to the market
is:





Thus, if the market absent supra-competitive pricing includes only Geor-
gia, but DOJ fails to account for this collusive pricing and hence defines
the market to include both Georgia and Alabama, then the relevant HHI
will be 900 rather than 2400. Accordingly, DOJ will be much less likely
to challenge any merger between firms in that market; indeed, in this case
DOJ's erroneous definition of the market would lead DOJ to view the
merger as a "safe harbor" merger rather than as one that DOJ should
challenge automatically.
we obtain equation (1):




This completes the proof.
Equation (1) can of course be viewed as a special case of a more general formula expressing the
HHI for a composite market (i.e., a market formed by combining two smaller markets) as a function
of the HHI's of the component markets. If HHIi is the HHI for a market of size X., HHI. is the
HHI for a market of size X-, and c = Xj/Xi, then we have the following expression for cotcentra-
tion in the composite marke', HHIi+j:
HHI i + c2 HHIjHHI(1 + ) (2)
58. This would be an expansion of the geographic dimension of the market; because of the supra-
competitive price in Georgia, Alabama producers can profitably ship broccoli to Georgia, whereas
they could not, it is assumed, if Georgia producers were charging a competitive price.
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Equation (1) also implies that, where the original or "proper" market
is highly concentrated (and pre-merger collusion is therefore likely), an
increase in the size of the market usually will decrease HHI. 9 Whenever
market conditions are ripe for pre-merger collusion, therefore, an overly
broad market usually decreases the likelihood of a challenge by DOJ.
Moreover, this tendency becomes even stronger as concentration in the
59. Revesz has shown that an increase in market size does not always decrease HHI. R. Revesz,
Market Power, Elasticity of Demand and the Justice Department's Guidelines for Horizontal Merg-
ers 19 (1983) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Yale Law Journal). The effect of an increase
in market size on HHI is therefore ambiguous.
The following inequality, however, gives necessary and sufficient conditions under which an in-
crease in the size of the market will increase HHI:
c+2
HHIa > - HHI o  (3)
c
This expression is proved below. An analysis of the expression shows that it is not likely to be satis-
fied in practice. First, HHIa must be larger than HHI o for an increase in the size of the market to
increase HHI (since c is always greater than 0). Second, where HHI is large, an increase in the size
of the market cannot increase HHI unless c is quite large, or HI~ia is quite large, or both. For
example, if HHI o is 1800 and c is 1, then the addition of a new group of firms will decrease HHI
unless HHIa is greater than 5400. Or if HHI is 1900 (only slightly larger than HHIo), then c must
be greater than 36. That is, the production of the added firms must be thirty-six times that of the
firms in the original market in order for the addition of the new firms to increase HHI. Otherwise the
addition of the new firms will decrease HHI. The following table gives some other combinations:
TABLE 1
Values of HHIa Below Which Any Increase in the
Size of the Market Will Decrease HHI
f







Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that, for that particular combination of c and
HHI0 , any increase in the size of the market will decrease HHI, no matter what
the value of HHIa.
Proof of Equation (3): We wish to derive the conditions under which an increase in the size of the
market will increase HHI, that is, the conditions under which HHI* will be greater than HHI0 .
From equation (1) we have:
HHI* = HHIo + c' HHI;,
(1 + c)'
Therefore, the following inequality describes the situation in which HHI* will be greater than
HHI0 :
HHI0 + c HHIp > HHI o
(I + c0
5000 3000 2000 1667 1500 1400 1200
7000 4200 2800 2333 2100 1960 1680
9000 5400 3600 3000 2700 2520 2160
* 7500 5000 4167 3750 3500 3000
• - * 8333 7500 7000 6000
' * * * * * i * *
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original market increases.60 In fact, if the original market is perfectly con-
centrated (i.e., it contains a single monopolist), an increase in the size of
the market always will decrease HHI.61
C. AHHI
The third and perhaps most important effect of an overly large market
is that it decreases AHHI. Specifically, a merger in a market that is artifi-
cially large by a factor of m produces a AHHI that is artificially small by
a factor of m-squared. 2 To see the importance of this observation, con-
We now solve for HHIa:
HHI 0 + 2 HHIa > (1 + c)' HHI o
HHI > (1 + c)
2 HHIO - HHIOHa C2
HH > (1 + 2c + c
2) HHI, - HHI0ac
2c + c2
HHIa > - HHI0
c+2
HH-Ia > HHI o
c
This completes the proof.
60. That is, as concentration in the original market increases, there is a greater likelihood that
increasing the market will decrease HHI.
Proof. Equation (3) can be rewritten:
C
HHI o < C HHI ac+2 
Like equation (3), this inequality describes the conditions under which an increase in the size of the
market will increase HHI. Observe that, for fixed c and HHIa, as HHI0 rises it is less likely that this
inequality will be satisfied. Hence as HHIo rises, it is less likely that an increase in the size of the
market will increase HHI, and correspondingly more likely that HHI will decrease.
61. This follows from the observation made supra note 59 that HHIa must be larger than HHI0
for an increase in the size of the market to increase HHI. If the original market is perfectly concen-
trated, i.e., HHI o = 10,000, then this condition cannot possibly be met.
62. Proof. Let Xo be the size of the original market, and X* be the size of the market after the
increase in market size, so that m = X*/X o.Let the production levels of the merging firms be q, and
q, respectively. The AHHI for any merger can be calculated by doubling the product of the market
shares of the merging firms. See 1984 Guidelines § 3.11 n.15. Accordingly, if DOJ defines the market
to be of size Xo, then AHHI is as follows:
AHH10 = 2 ( q') ( q2)
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sider again the example of the broccoli producers."3 If, as in that example,
a supra-competitive baseline price leads to a market twice as large as a
competitive baseline does, a merger between two firms in the expanded
market will produce a AHHI four times smaller than if DOJ used the
competitive price. This makes a challenge by DOJ significantly less likely.
Suppose, for example, that firms accounting for 15% and 10% of the
Georgia market merged. Then the relevant AHHI would be either 300 or
75, depending upon whether the market included only Georgia or both
Georgia and Alabama. 4
III. APPROPRIATENESS OF A COMPETITIVE BASELINE PRICE:
THE MEANING OF "LESSEN COMPETITION"
Paradoxically, then, a merger between colluding firms may fare much
better under all the Guidelines' measures than a merger in a competitive
but otherwise identical industry.6 5 As the preceding analysis indicates, this
If, however, DOJ defines the market to be of size X*, then AHHI is as follows:
AHHI* =2 (T") ( q)
-2 ( ' ( ) q
in 2 0 X
or
AHHI* - AHHI o
m12
Thus, defining the market to be of size X* rather than of size Xo results in a reduction of AHHI by a
factor of m-squared.
63. See supra p. 680.
64. These numbers are calculated as follows: If Georgia is the relevant market, then AHHI is
2(15)(10), or 300. If, however, both Georgia and Alabama are included in the market (so that the
market is twice what it would be if only Georgia were included), the market shares of the merging
firms are 7.5% and 5%, respectively, and AHHI is therefore 2(7.5)(5), or 75.
65. As an illustration, consider again the example of the two broccoli producers discussed above,
supra pp. 680, 682-83. If the two merging broccoli producers are members of a successful cartel, then
the market will be defined so as to include producers in both Georgia and Alabama, the firms' market
shares will be 7.5% and 5%, post-merger HHI will be 900, and the AHHI produced by the merger
will be 75. Now suppose, instead, that Georgia broccoli producers have not succeeded in forming a
cartel and are charging competitive prices. Otherwise the industry is identical to the one described
above. Then the geographic market includes only Georgia, the firms' market shares are 15% and 10%,
HHI is 2400, and AHHI is 300. The only difference between the first and second mergers is that the
first merger takes place in a cartelized industry while the second takes place in a competitive industry.
Yet the Guidelines treat the first merger much more leniently than the second. Indeed, the first
merger falls into a "safe harbor" because post-merger HHI is less than 1000.
Note, however, that an improperly large market need not always lead to greater leniency. First, as
already noted, see supra note 59, an artificially large market may increase HHI. Second, an artifi-
cially large market might cause a vertical or conglomerate (non-horizontal) merger to appear horizon-
tal, thus subjecting the merger to the stricter standards that apply to horizontal mergers.
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paradox is the product of DOJ's willingness to employ a supra-
competitive price as the baseline for defining the relevant market.
Richard Posner66 and William Baxter,67 however, have argued that
whenever the prevailing market price is higher than the competitive price,
courts and enforcement agencies should use the prevailing price in defin-
ing the market.6 8 Only then, they reason, can a market analysis provide
the information pertinent to a section 7 inquiry: the ability of the merging
firms to impose further price increases upon their customers.6 9 In their
view, a merger between firms already charging a monopoly price is innoc-
uous, since the firms cannot profitably increase their price after the
merger.70 Such a merger, then, does not "lessen competition '' 71 and there-
fore does not violate section 7.
Whatever their other weaknesses, the 1968 Guidelines, which the 1982 Guidelines replaced, did not
discriminate in favor of firms already exercising market power because the 1968 Guidelines defined
markets without reference to interchangeability: They defined the product market as consisting of
"any product or service which is distinguishable as a matter of commercial practice from other prod-
ucts or services," and defined the geographic market as "any commercially significant section of the
country." U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines-1968 (May 30, 1968), reprinted in 2 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 4510 (Aug. 9, 1982). Of course, the 1968 Guidelines' disregard of interchangea-
bility made their market definition procedures rather arbitrary.
66. According to Posner:
This problem [the Cellophane fallacy] does not arise in a merger case, where the issue is not
whether the current price exceeds the competitive level but whether the merger might result in
a further deterioration of competitive conditions. If there are good substitutes in consumption
or production at the current price, it is a detail whether that price is competitive or
monopolistic.
R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 128-29 (emphasis added). Posner is now a judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
67. Baxter has made a similar argument:
The problem in the Cellophane case can lead to erroneous analysis under § 2 of the Sherman
Act because in such a case it is necessary to determine whether a firm is presently exercising
market power in order to determine whether corrective action is necessary to reduce that
power. On the other hand, horizontal merger analysis under § 7 of the Clayton Act is con-
cerned with the probability that a merger will decrease competition in the future . . . .If the
firm or firms are exercising their market power . . . so that a 5% price increase will not be
profitable, however, it may be inappropriate to challenge the merger. Prohibiting the merger
likely will have no effect on the exercise of market power ....
Baxter, supra note 19, at 624 n.35. Baxter was Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust
Division when the 1982 version of the present Guidelines was released.
68. Gregory J. Werden, Senior Economist at the Antitrust Division, has a similar view. See Wer-
den, supra note 33, at 525-26. Werden, however, notes an "exception" to this position. After refer-
ring to the Guidelines' provision that the prevailing or likely future price will be used as the baseline,
see 47 Fed. Reg., supra note 1, at 28,494 n.6, he says that the "only possible exception" to the rule
that the prevailing rather than the competitive price should be used as the baseline in strictly horizon-
tal mergers is a case in which the merger will help hold a shaky cartel together. Werden, supra note
33, at 526. The problem with this position, however, is that DOJ cannot know whether the merging
firms are members of a shaky cartel without first determining that they are members of a cartel. Such
a determination requires that DOJ analyze, directly or indirectly, whether the merging firms are
charging a supra-competitive price. Under the Guidelines, however, DOJ will not make such an
analysis if a merger falls into a "safe harbor" or "unlikely to challenge" category. See infra note 92.
69. See supra notes 66-67.
70. The monopoly price is, by definition, the price at which a monopolist's profits are maximized.
Thus, a firm charging a monopoly price cannot profitably increase its price. See R. POSNER, supra
note 13, at 241.
71. See supra notes 66-67. There appears to be no case law directly supporting or refuting this
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This view is questionable because it rests upon an interpretation of sec-
tion 7 that is overly narrow as a matter of economic theory and is incon-
sistent with the judicial doctrine of "actual potential competition." DOJ's
acceptance of this view, moreover, leads to an interpretation of concentra-
tion data that is of limited usefulness in analyzing a merger's competitive
effects.
A. Economic Theory
Contrary to the Posner-Baxter view, a producer's ability to impose ad-
ditional price increases upon consumers is not the only factor that, as a
matter of economic theory, ought to be considered in analyzing a horizon-
tal merger under section 7. Although a merger between firms already
charging a collusive, supra-competitive price might not permit an addi-
tional increase in price, such a merger might nonetheless "lessen competi-
tion" in violation of section 7 by giving the new firm an increased ability
to sustain a supra-competitive price. In the language of the Guidelines,
such a merger would thereby "facilitate" the exercise of whatever market
power already exists. 2
A merger between colluding firms might lead to this result for two rea-
sons. First, a smaller number of firms generally can collude more easily
than a larger number.7 A single firm monopoly, for example, is less
prone to spontaneous collapse than a cartel composed of many small pro-
ducers. Second, a merger often reduces the likelihood that a firm's pricing
activities will be challenged in court. Because a firm cannot conspire with
itself to fix prices,7 4 for example, a monopoly created by merger becomes
position. Many of the "potential competition" cases discussed below, however, indirectly support the
contrary position. See infra notes 83-85.
72. The Guidelines state that "mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance 'market
power' or to facilitate its exercise." 1984 Guidelines § 1 (emphasis added). The Guidelines also recog-
nize that, in a market which is currently performing non-competitively, "[i]ncreased concentration
. . . through merger could further facilitate the collusion that already exists." Id. § 3.45.
73. There are two broad reasons why price-fixing (and output-restricting) agreements tend to
break down. First, the parties may have difficulty agreeing on price levels and market shares, a diffi-
culty stemming from existing cost and market share differences. F. SCHERER, supra note 5, at 171-72.
Second, once an agreement has been reached, individual members have strong incentives to cheat on
one another by slightly undercutting the fixed price so as to increase their profits. Id. at 171-73. The
second problem may be particularly acute in markets where effective monitoring of the agreement is
difficult because of poor record-keeping, heterogeneity of products, etc. Other things being equal, these
difficulties decrease as the number of colluding firms decreases.
74. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1982)), prohibits any "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade,"
implying that there must be a plurality of actors for a violation to occur. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp.
v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S.Ct. 2731, 2742-44 (1984) (corporation and wholly-owned subsid-
iary not legally separate actors); H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244
(5th Cir. 1978) (corporation cannot conspire with its wholly-owned subsidiary or with its employees);
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 82-84 (9th Cir.
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immune to price-fixing challenges from DOJ, the FTC, or private plain-
tiffs;7 5 in addition, as long as the new firm avoids such practices as preda-
tory pricing, it may face little risk of a section 2 monopolization chal-
lenge.7 ' These considerations are important to colluding firms. Members
of a cartel face the constant threat of a price-fixing suit, even if their
collusion is merely tacit.7 Moreover, since most cartels are unstable, col-
luding firms also face the possibility that the cartel might collapse at any
time.7 8 Indeed, according to economic theory, market forces make cartels
inherently unstable.
7 9
A merger permits colluding firms to avoid or diminish both of these
threats to their ability to charge supra-competitive prices. By abrogating
these threats, a merger between colluding firms "lessens competition" be-
cause it decreases the likelihood that prices in the market will return to
competitive levels. A market consisting only of a monopoly is less competi-
tive than a cartel, even if the cartel and monopoly currently charge the
same price. Hence competition is lessened by the stabilization of existing
supra-competitive prices just as it is lessened by additional movement
away from competitive prices.
Section 7, therefore, should not be interpreted to prevent only those
horizontal mergers that permit additional price increases. Rather, it
should be interpreted to prohibit any horizontal merger that either causes
prices in a market to move further from competitive levels or helps pre-
vent the market from returning to a competitive state. Thus, the Posner-
Baxter interpretation of section 7, which does not view the stabilization of
supra-competitive prices as a lessening of competition, is too narrow.
1969) (rejecting doctrine of intra-corporate conspiracy), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); J. VON
KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS § 6.0112][b] (1983) (general discussion
of doctrine); Note, "Conspiring Entities" Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 95 HARV. L. REV.
661, 662-65 (1982) (discussing intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine).
75. The newly-formed monopolist still could be prosecuted or sued, however, for conspiracy to fix
prices with other firms, or for price-fixing occurring before the merger.
76. A successful monopolization action requires a showing that a company not only possesses
monopoly power, but also has acquired or maintained that power through willful acts such as preda-
tion. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71, 576 (1966); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945).
77. Not only explicit collusion, but many types of tacit collusion are illegal under § 1 of the
Sherman Act. Tacit collusion has been held illegal in such "conscious parallelism" cases as Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939) (finding of illegal, tacit agreement among
film distributors not to distribute prime films to "second-run" theaters; holding that agreement may
be inferred from consciously parallel action that is interdependent). See also F. SCHERER, supra note
5, at 513-20 (discussion of other conscious parallelism cases).
78. See supra note 73. History suggests that holding a cartel together for any substantial period
can be very difficult. See, e.g., Voigt, German Experience with Cartels and Their Control During
Pre-War and Post-War Periods, in COMPETrrIoN, CARTELS AND THEIR REGULATION 179-80, 184,
200-01 (J. Miller ed. 1962). But Cf F. SCHERER, supra note 5, at 173 (OPEC a "spectacular
counterexample").
79. See, e.g., H. VARIAN, supra note 17, at 73-74 (mathematical demonstration that any member
of cartel can increase member's profits by cheating on cartel).
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B. Judicial Doctrine
The Posner-Baxter interpretation of section 7 also is inconsistent with
the judicial doctrine of "actual potential competition." Under this doc-
trine, a non-horizontal merger or acquisition may be held illegal under
section 7 if it eliminates a firm that otherwise would have entered a mar-
ket,80 even though the firm might not be perceived as a potential entrant
by other firms in the market, and therefore might not affect their pricing
decisions.81 Under this doctrine, then, a merger may be objectionable, not
because it causes an immediate deterioration in market performance, but
because it forecloses an opportunity for improved performance in the fu-
ture.8 2 Hence the doctrine is inconsistent with the Posner-Baxter interpre-
tation of section 7, which focuses only on the immediate effects of a
merger on market performance.
The actual potential competition doctrine has neither been accepted nor
rejected by the United States Supreme Court. 83 Some lower courts 84 and
the FTC85 have accepted the doctrine, however, and the doctrine is explic-
itly incorporated in the Guidelines.88 In the case of non-horizontal merg-
ers, therefore, even the Guidelines do not interpret the "lessen competi-
tion" language of section 7 to mean that a merger is illegal only if it
causes additional deterioration in market performance. There appears to
be no good theoretical or doctrinal reason to apply such a narrow inter-
pretation to mergers between colluding firms.8"
80. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 636-40 (1977); J. VON KALI-
NOWSKI, supra note 74, § 19.02[8][a].
81. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 80, at 636; J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 74, § 19.02[8][bl.
82. See J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 74, § 19.02[8][b].
83. The Court has declined to pass on the validity of the doctrine on at least two occasions. See
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 640 (1974); United States v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537 (1973).
84. See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971, 978 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that FTC
had proved defendant an actual potential entrant), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); United States v.
Siemens Corp., 621 F.2d 499, 506-07 (2d Cir. 1980) (tentatively accepting doctrine, but holding that
government failed to show that any potential increase in competition would be significant); FTC v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 293-98 (4th Cir. 1977) (acknowledging validity of doctrine, but
holding that proofs were insufficient). But see Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 352-55 (2d Cir.
1982) (refusing to reach issue of doctrine's validity).
85. See, e.g., The Bendix Corp., 77 F.T.C. 731, 817 (1970) (requiring divestiture of recently
acquired company, in part because acquisition removed acquiring firm as actual potential entrant),
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971); Beatrice Foods Co., 86 F.T.C.
1, 65 & n.6 (1975) (acknowledging validity of doctrine, but holding that proofs were insufficient),
aff d on other grounds, 540 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1976); British Oxygen Co., Ltd., 86 F.T.C. 1241,
1351, 1360-63 (1975) (affirming divestiture order on grounds that acquisition had eliminated acquir-
ing firm as actual potential entrant), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557
F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
86. See 1984 Guidelines § 4.112.
87. There are two obvious but unpersuasive arguments against application of the actual potential
competition doctrine to the question of how to treat mergers between colluding firms. First, it might
be argued that the actual potential competition doctrine sheds no light on this question because the
doctrine has been applied only to non-horizontal mergers. But nothing precludes analyzing mergers
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C. Interpretation of Concentration Data
The Posner-Baxter interpretation of section 7 produces an additional
difficulty: When DOJ follows that interpretation and uses a supra-
competitive baseline price in defining the market, the Guidelines' concen-
tration data lose much of their value as a measure of market power. In the
Guidelines' analytic framework, concentration is useful in ascertaining
market power in part because it indicates the likelihood that firms in an
industry can raise their prices above competitive levels (i.e., form a cartel)
or, having raised them, maintain them at that level (i.e., hold their cartel
together)."8 For the HHI concentration data to reflect the likelihood that a
group of firms currently charging a supra-competitive price can maintain
that price, the market must be defined using the competitive price as a
baseline. If the current, supra-competitive price is used as a baseline, the
concentration data can predict only whether members of the cartel could
successfully collude with other sellers of close substitutes 9 to raise the
price even higher; the data cannot predict the likelihood that the existing
cartel will hold.90
between colluding firms as non-horizontal, potential competition mergers. Since colluding firms by
definition do not at present compete with each other, and since a horizontal merger is often defined as
a merger between competitors, a merger between colluding firms is arguably non-horizontal. More-
over, since colluding firms likely will compete with each other when their cartel collapses, the firms
are, in a sense, potential competitors. Hence there is no reason why mergers between these firms
should be treated under a more lenient standard than that applied to other mergers of potential
competitors.
The second argument echoes the most frequent objection to the actual potential competition doc-
trine, namely, that the doctrine penalizes firms, not for any wrongdoing, but for doing less competitive
good than they might have done. See D. ARMENTANO, THE MYnHs OF AhNTRusr 235 (1972). This
argument has little force when applied to a merger between colluding firms, however. Using a com-
petitive rather than a prevailing, supra-competitive baseline price in such a case does not penalize the
merging firms. It merely prevents the enforcement authority from treating the merger more leniently
than it would have treated it absent the collusion.
88. See 1984 Guidelines § 1 (market power defined as including ability to "maintain prices above
competitive levels for a significant period of time").
89. "Substitutes," as used here, can refer either to "product" substitutes or to "geographic" substi-
tutes (identical products produced elsewhere).
90. To see how the Posner-Baxter view alters the interpretation of the HHI data, consider the
example of the broccoli producers, supra p. 680. If the market is defined to include only Georgia (the
"proper" market), HHI (which is 2400 in the example) measures the dispersion of the market shares
of the Georgia firms, and can be used to predict the likelihood of successful collusion among those
firms. Since Georgia producers are presently charging a supra-competitive price, this HHI can be
used to predict, not the likelihood that Georgia producers will collude (they have already done so), but
the likelihood that their collusion will be successful, i.e., that their cartel will hold.
Suppose, however, that because of a supra-competitive baseline price the market is defined to in-
clude both Georgia and Alabama. Now HHI (which is 900 in the example) gives the size dispersion
of the firms in both states, which can be used to predict the likelihood of successful collusion among
those firms. Under the assumption that Alabama producers have not successfully cartelized, this HHI
is a predictor of the likelihood that Alabama producers will be able, in the future, to form and main-
tain a cartel among themselves and with Georgia producers.
The latter HHI does not provide any useful information about the Georgia producers alone. It does
not help predict the likelihood that Georgia producers will be able to prevent their cartel from collaps-
ing spontaneously. Moreover, this HHI does not indicate the likelihood that Alabama producers
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As the preceding discussion has shown, the Posner-Baxter interpreta-
tion of section 7 is inconsistent not only with economic theory and judicial
doctrine, but also with various provisions of the Guidelines. Despite those
provisions, the Guidelines adhere to the Posner-Baxter interpretation and
do allow mergers between colluding firms."' By allowing such mergers,
they permit firms that can hold a cartel together, even for a short period,
to achieve in effect the status of legal monopolies. Since in such cases the
Guidelines do not require DOJ to determine whether the merging firms
are charging supra-competitive prices, 2 neither DOJ nor the public may
know when this is happening.
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IV. THE SOLUTION, ITS COSTS, AND ITS BENEFITS
Perhaps the most obvious solution to this problem is for DOJ always to
determine the competitive price, then employ it in each application of the
Guidelines. Unfortunately, there is no quick or inexpensive way to get
even a good estimate of the competitive price when a supra-competitive
price prevails in the market. Nevertheless, the Guidelines themselves pro-
vide the elements of a simple and effective solution, the benefits of which
clearly outweigh the costs.
would underprice Georgia producers and thereby destroy the existing cartel in Georgia. That infor-
mation, rather, is reflected in the definition of the Georgia market, from which HHI for the Georgia
firms is computed. The HHI for Georgia and Alabama producers indicates only the likelihood that
Alabama producers would prevent the Georgia producers from raising the price still higher.
91. See supra p. 676.
92. The Guidelines do suggest criteria for indirectly analyzing whether the market is currently
performing "non-competitively," i.e., whether collusion is taking place. 1984 Guidelines § 3.4 (criteria
include stability of market shares, whether market shares of leading firms have been declining in
recent years, and profitability of leading firms over long periods). These criteria, however, are inade-
quate for two reasons. First, because they focus on long-run phenomena, they may fail to call DOJ's
attention to evidence that the market in question has been recently cartelized. Second, according to the
Guidelines, DOJ will not even look for such evidence if the merger in question initially appears to
fall into the Guidelines' "safe harbor" or "unlikely to challenge" categories. See id. § 3.4 ("[market
performance data] most likely to be important where the Department's decision whether to challenge
a merger is otherwise close"); id. § 3.11 (analysis of market performance mentioned only in connec-
tion with mergers not falling into "likely," "unlikely," or "safe harbor" categories). The example of
the broccoli producers, supra pp. 680, 682-83, illustrates the latter problem. Suppose that a supra-
competitive price, as in the example, leads DOJ to define the market as including Georgia and Ala-
bama. Then the merger will fall into the "safe harbor" category. In this case, DOJ will not examine
indirect evidence of collusion, even though the merger clearly would be objectionable if the market
were defined properly.
93. Since individuals (other than litigants) have no subpoena power, it is usually very difficult for
individuals to obtain the data necessary to second-guess a definition of a market by a court or enforce-
ment agency. Accordingly, it is very difficult to tell which mergers are between colluding firms and
which are not. This is especially true when the enforcement agency decides against a challenge.
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A. A Proposed Solution
The Guidelines include "market performance," which comprises pric-
ing behavior, as a factor to consider when evaluating mergers."' They also
discuss three types of evidence that may be considered in determining
whether an industry is performing competitively or noncompetitively.95
The problem with the Guidelines' treatment of market performance, how-
ever, is that they call for consideration of performance only in "intermedi-
ate" cases, for example, cases in which AHHI is above 100 and HHI is
between 1000 and 1800.6 Thus, DOJ will not consider performance data
if a merger initially appears to fall into a "safe harbor" or "unlikely to
challenge" category, i.e., the post-merger HHI is below 1000 or AHHI is
below 50. As shown above, a merger might fall within one of these catego-
ries only because DOJ has erroneously used a supra-competitive baseline
price in defining the market.97 Hence DOJ's failure to consider perform-
ance information before defining the relevant market may lead to mean-
ingless measures of concentration.
This suggests that, to the extent it can, DOJ (and others who have
occasion to apply the Guidelines) ought to examine performance before
defining the market.98 This inquiry should proceed in two stages. First,
DOJ should examine the profitability of the merging firms during recent
months and years to determine whether their profitability significantly ex-
ceeds that of other firms comparable in capital intensity and risk.99 This is
similar to one of the types of evidence the Guidelines call for in analyzing
market performance in "intermediate" cases.10 If neither of the merging
firms shows high profits, then DOJ can assume that neither firm is suc-
cessfully exercising market power; DOJ therefore may use the prevailing
price as the baseline for defining the market.
If, however, one or both of the merging firms shows unusual profitabil-
ity, then DOJ should proceed to the second level of inquiry: It must deter-
mine whether the excess profits are the result of market power or merely
the result of lower-than-average costs brought about by superior effi-
94. See 1984 Guidelines § 3.45.
95. See id.
96. See id. § 3.11(b), (c).
97. See supra pp. 680, 682-83.
98. DOJ technically cannot examine the performance of the entire market until it has defined the
market. There are, however, certain characteristics of the merging firms, discussed below, from which
DOJ can to some degree infer the performance of the overall market-whatever the market turns out
to be.
99. Although excess profits do not necessarily imply that a firm is exercising market power, see
Schmalensee, Another Look at Market Power, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1789, 1805-06 (1982), excess profits
usually accompany the successful exercise of such power. Hence the absence of excess profits generally
indicates that a firm does not possess market power.
100. See 1984 Guidelines § 3.45(c) (profitability of leading firms in an industry).
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ciency. Again, the Guidelines themselves may facilitate this analysis be-
cause they suggest additional types of indirect evidence of market power,
to be used in "intermediate" cases, which do not require prior definition
of the market. This evidence includes past involvement by the merging
firms in price-fixing or customer allocation;01' the presence of such "facil-
itating practices" as mandatory delivered pricing, exchange of price or
output information with other firms, or price protection clauses;.. 2 and
the availability within the industry of information about specific transac-
tions and about buyer characteristics.' 0 3 If, as a result of this second stage
of inquiry, DOJ is convinced that the unusual profits are the result of
efficiency rather than market power, then DOJ may infer that the pre-
vailing price is competitive. It therefore may use the prevailing price as
the baseline for defining the market and proceed with its usual analysis.
On the other hand, if DOJ determines that profits are high because of
market power, then any concentration data obtained using the prevailing,
supra-competitive price would be misleading. Accordingly, DOJ should
adopt one of two approaches. First, it might simply analyze the merger
under the Guidelines' other criteria04 without relying on concentration
measures. Alternatively, it might attempt to estimate the competitive price,
use it as a baseline for defining the market, and then employ its usual
concentration analysis.' 05 Literature on predatory pricing suggests that
there are feasible methods for determining average total cost,' 06 which is a
good proxy for the long run competitive price.'0 7 Courts have used this
approach in predatory pricing cases,'Os and the DOJ and FTC, with their
101. See 1984 Guidelines § 3.44(a).
102. See id. § 3.44(b).
103. See id. § 3.42. Schmalensee suggests two additional indications of market power: price dis-
crimination and predation. See Schmalensee, supra note 99, at 1806-07.
104. See supra text accompanying note 30. Although some of these criteria require that DOJ
have at least some idea what the "true" market is, DQJ can apply these criteria to the merger without
necessarily adopting a single definition of the market. It might, for example, apply each criterion to
the merger under a variety of plausible assumptions about the size of the market in which the merging
firms compete.
105. As yet another alternative, DOJ also may decide to initiate a § 1 price fixing suit against the
merging firms. But such a suit might not obviate the need for DOJ to challenge the merger. DOJ
might lose its § I suit because of poor advocacy or incompetent judging, or it might fail to obtain a
sufficiently strong remedy.
106. E.g., Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE
L.J. 213, 252-53 & n.79 (1979) (arguing that pricing below average total cost should be presump-
tively predatory, and suggesting how to determine when this has occurred).
107. Average total cost is a good proxy for the long run competitive price because, according to
Joskow and Klevorick, "[iln a competitive market, the equilibrium market price will equal the aver-
age total cost of production, including a normal rate of return on capital invested, and this will, in
turn, equal long-run marginal cost." Id. at 252-53.
108. In Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 879 (1977), the dominant firm in an industry, accused of predatory pricing, was found to
have held its price below average total cost but above both marginal cost and average variable cost. See
551 F.2d at 792, 797. The court found no violation, however, on the ground that the firm simply had
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staffs of economists and other antitrust specialists, may be able to conduct
such a study before determining whether to challenge a merger. The im-
portant point, however, is that an enforcement agency should not place
any merger within a "safe harbor" or "unlikely to challenge" category
without first ascertaining that the merging firms are charging a competi-
tive price.
B. Costs Versus Benefits
The costs of obtaining the data necessary to implement this two-stage
inquiry should not be prohibitive. The suggested approach does not neces-
sarily require that DOJ undertake the costly, time-consuming task of esti-
mating the competitive price. And, as previously noted, the Guidelines al-
ready call for most of the required information."' 9
The benefits of the proposed approach outweigh these costs. Implemen-
tation of the proposal promises two substantial benefits. First, it will help
DOJ make better enforcement decisions. Second, it will remove the per-
verse incentives created by the Guidelines' present leniency toward merg-
ers between colluding firms. The Guidelines' faulty market definition pro-
cedures permit and encourage such firms to merge as soon as the firms
succeed in maintaining a supra-competitive price.'1 The faulty proce-
dures, therefore, may help to entrench market power, making the affected
industries perform less competitively."' Since cartel behavior-especially
tacit collusion-may be widespread," 2 the Guidelines' faulty procedures
might contribute to the legal monopolization of large sectors of the econ-
omy, which in turn would impose substantial costs upon consumers." 3
engaged in price competition in the face of excess capacity. Id. at 796-97. See also William Inglis &
Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 1981) (establish-
ing rule that, if defendant's prices are below average total cost but above average variable cost, plain-
tiff has burden of showing that defendant's prices were predatory), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982);
Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377, 1388-89 (9th Cir.) (holding that IBM's prices
for peripheral equipment were above average total cost, and were therefore presumptively not preda-
tory), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 370 (1983).
109. See supra pp. 690-91.
110. See supra pp. 685-86.
111. Ordover & Willig, The 1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: An Economic As-
sessment, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 535, 543 (1983) ("increased concentration stabilizes noncompetitive be-
havior in markets that already do not function well").
112. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 41 (because courts and enforcers focus on evidence of
overt conspiracy rather than economic evidence of collusion, "much serious price fixing may escape
detection altogether").
113. See id. at 8-22 (theoretical discussion of social costs of monopoly); F. SCHERER, supra note
5, at 14-21 (same); id. at 459-64 (attempts to measure social costs of monopoly and cartelization
empirically).
The fear that members of a cartel might try to stabilize their pricing arrangements through merger,
moreover, is more than theoretical. This has occurred a number of times during American history.
Examples are the steel, tobacco, motion picture, tin, and corn refining industries. See I S. WHrrNEY,
ANTITRUST POLICIES 257-59 (1958); 2 S. WHITNEY, ANTITRUST PouciEs 14-15, 146-47, 197,
258-60 (1958).
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CONCLUSION
Aristotle once warned that "a small initial deviation from the truth
multiplies itself ten-thousandfold as the argument proceeds." '114 A seem-
ingly minor error in the DOJ Merger Guidelines has potentially serious
consequences: When DOJ uses them to analyze certain mergers between
firms charging supra-competitive prices, the Guidelines' present failure to
use the competitive price as a baseline for defining the market artificially
lowers market shares and concentration. This leads DOJ to underestimate
the anti-competitive consequences of the merger and hence reduces the
likelihood of a DOJ challenge. The Guidelines thereby encourage collud-
ing firms to merge by giving them a way of abrogating the two primary
threats to their ability to charge supra-competitive prices: price-fixing
challenges and the market forces that make cartels inherently unstable.
Since a merger that abrogates these threats lessens competition within
the meaning of the Clayton Act, DOJ should examine each proposed
merger carefully to ascertain whether the merging firms have been charg-
ing supra-competitive prices prior to the merger. When it finds evidence
of supra-competitive pricing, DOJ should either disregard its concentra-
tion data and evaluate the merger under the Guidelines' other criteria, or
estimate the competitive price and use that price as the baseline for defin-
ing the relevant market. Courts and the FTC should make similar adjust-
ments when applying the Guidelines.
-Gene C. Schaerr
114. ARISTOTLE, ON THE HEAvENs 33 (W. Guthrie trans. 1939).
